ایف آئی آرکو ختم کروانے کا طریقہ کار !! ایف آئی آر کس طرح خارج کرائی جائے؟
Quashment of FIR????? (2018 Pcr. LJ 826)
مخالفین کو پھنسانے کیلئے جھوٹی اور فرضی کہانیوں پر مبنی ایف آئی آرز درج کرانا پاکستان میں عام ہے۔کسی کیخلاف جھوٹی ایف آئی آر درج کرانا ایک جرم ہے۔جس کی سزا7 سال تک قید ہوسکتی ہے۔ (دفعہ 182 تعزیرات پاکستان) اسی طرح اس جھوٹی ایف آئی آر میں درج کی گئی کہانی کے گواہوں کو بھی جھوٹی گواہی دینے پرسخت سزائیں مقرر ہیں (سیکشنز 193،194 پاکستان پینل کوڈ) جھوٹٰی گواہی دینے والے کو سزائے موت تک دی جاسکتی ہے۔
آپ کیخلاف جھوٹی ایف آئی آر درج ہوجائے تو کیا کریں؟
اگر ایف آئی آر کے اندراج کے بعد آپ کا چالان متعلقہ عدالت میں پیش نہیں ہوا اور اس پر ٹرائل شروع نہیں ہوا تو آپ آئین کے آرٹیکل 199 اور ضابطہ فوجداری کی دفعہ 561اے کے تحت اس ایف آئی آر کے اخراج کیلئے ہائیکورٹ میں رٹ دائر کر سکتے ہیں۔آپ اپنا کیس ثابت کرتے ہیں تو ہائیکورٹ یہ ایف آئی آر خارج کرنے کا حکم دے گی۔
اسکی ایک مثال 2008 میں ہائیکورٹ کے جج جسٹس کاظم علی ملک کے ایک فیصلے سے دوں گا۔اس کیس میں مخالفین کا آپس میں لین دین کا کوئی مسئلہ تھا۔ایک فیکٹری کے مالک نے ایک شخص سے تیل خریدا تھا اور ادائیگی نہیں کی تھی۔یہ دیوانی عدالت کا معاملہ تھا لیکن مدعی نے پولیس سے ملی بھگت کر کے فیکٹری مالک کیخلاف تعزیرات پاکستان کی دفعہ 406 کے تحت مقدمہ درج کرا دیا۔عدالت نے یہ ایف آئی آر خارج کرنے کا حکم دیا اور کہا کہ یہ دیوانی عدالت کا مسئلہ ہے پولیس نے اپنے اختیار سے تجاوز کیا،نہ صرف یہ بلکہ ایف آئی درج کرنے والے تھانہ باغبانپورہ لاہور کے سب انسپکٹر اصغر علی اور تفتیشی سب انسپکٹر عرفان علی کو رٹ کرنے والے شخص کو 50 ہزار روپے جرمانہ ادا کرنے کا بھی حکم دیا۔
2008 YLR 2695. 2008 YLR 2668
تاہم اگر اس ایف آئی آر کے اندراج کے بعد ملزم کا چالان پیش کر دیا گیا اور ٹرائل شروع ہوگیا ہو تو ہائیکورٹ اسے اس نچلی عدالت سے ہی ریلیف لینے کی ہدایت کرتی ہے۔اس صورت میں مجسٹریٹ ضابطہ فوجداری کی دفعہ 249 اے اور سیشن جج ضابطہ فوجداری کی دفعہ 265 کے کے تحت ملزم کو کسی بھی وقت مقدمہ سے بری کرسکتا ہے۔
پولیس رولز 1934 کا قانون نمبر 24 اعشاریہ 7 متعلقہ پولیس افسر کو بھی یہ اختیار دیتا ہے کہ وہ درج شدہ ایف آئی آر کو منسوخ کرسکتا..
QUASHING OF FIR; A DEAD LETTER?
This article examines the inherent powers preserved to the High Court under section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (hereinafter "the Cr.P.C.") and the scope of exercise of these powers to quash a First Information Report ("FIR"). This article also examines whether reliance on precedent in this respect is justified when it is an established jurisprudential principle that in criminal matters, each case must be decided on its own facts and circumstances.
Legislative history
Section 561-A was inserted by the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 18 [XVIII] of 1923 and provides for "Saving of inherent power of High Court", in the following terms:
"Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code; or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice."(emphasis provided).
This inherent power has been characterized as a reserve fund of powers, a residual source of Court power, which the Court may draw upon as necessary whenever it is equitable to do so, in particular to ensure the observance of due process of law, to prevent vexation or oppression, to do justice between the parties and to secure a fair trial between them. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has recognized the power conferred on the High Court under section 561-A as not conferring "any new powers but simply preserves the inherent power lest it be thought that High Court has only those powers conferred on it by the Cr.P.C.". This is somewhat a departure from the Court's earlier finding that before 1923, there was doubt whether the High Court enjoyed such inherent power or not, which was not invokable in respect of any matter covered by the specific provisions of the Code or in a manner inconsistent therewith; it may be restricted to either of the three purposes mentioned in the provision itself. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shoukat Bus Service, Shahkot v. The State and another held that "the inherent power of the High Court is of a very wide and indefinable nature and in exercise of this power the High Court can make all such orders which may be necessary to do real and substantial justice and prevent abuse of the process of the Court, subject only to the limitation that it cannot override an express provision of code".
Criteria for quashing an FIR
A study of the leading reported cases reflects the reasoning behind the criteria developed by the superior Courts to consider when adjudicating on a petition praying for the quashing of an FIR. The factors that have prevailed with the Courts are whether there is: (a) any jurisdictional defect; (b) a patent violation of some provision of law; (c) allegation as contained in complaint or FIR, even if believed, no case can be made out; (d) continuation of proceedings would amount to sheer abuse of process of the court; (e) an endeavor was made to enforce civil liability through the machinery of criminal court/law. This includes the deduction that the Court may quash criminal proceedings if it is satisfied that (a) a false complaint has been brought and (b) that the process of Court is being abused to subject the accused to unnecessary harassment.
In Mirza Naseem Baig v. Muhammad Iqbal and another7, the Supreme Court interpreted the scope of the powers of the High Court to affirm that the High Court may also quash proceedings "for other reasons which impel the Court to conclude that it would not be in the ends of justice to allow the prosecution to continue." The Court did qualify that this could be done based on cogent materials in the petition that reflected the prosecution was launched for improper motives, for instance, merely to harass the accused or that its continuance would be an abuse of the process of the Court.
Importantly, the superior Courts have consistently held that especially in criminal matters, each case must be assessed on its own factual matrix and attendant circumstances.9
Application of "inherent power"
What emerges from a study of the case law and application of section 561-A, Cr.P.C. is the interpretation of "inherent power" not only in and of itself but additionally, in relation to the powers of the trial court under sections 249-A/285-K, Cr.P.C. The power vested in a trial court to acquit an accused under sections 249-A and 285-K, Cr.P.C. is commonly perceived as an alternate remedy to be exhausted before such inherent power may be exercised. Before delving into the analysis thereof, it is important to invite the reader of this article to consider whether inherent powers can be exercised only in the absence of so-called alternative remedies? In other words, is the High Court restricted in its exercise of inherent power by any qualification or is such a restriction inherently self-contradictory?
The superior Courts have delivered conflicting interpretations of the scope of inherent jurisdiction under section 561A, Cr.P.C. in relation to the jurisdiction of the trial court under sections 249-A and 265-K, Cr.P.C. A three-Member Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Munir Ahmed v. State10 held that powers of the trial Court under the said sections are co-extensive, incidentally of the same nature, akin to, co-related with and similar to the powers of the High Court under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. and both can be resorted to. However, the Court held that though it would be proper to approach the trial Court in the first instance, there is nothing to bar the High Court from entertaining, in appropriate cases, an application under section 561A, Cr.P.C. In exceptional cases, the High Court may exercise its jurisdiction under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. without waiting for the trial Court to pass orders under section 249-A or 265-K "if the facts of the case so warrant to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice". A detailed elucidation of the phrase "process of the court" may be found in Ghulam Qadir Khan v. State12. A three-Member Bench of the apex Court held in Ghulam Muhammad v. Muzammal Khan and 4 others13 the inherent jurisdiction provided by section 561A, Cr.P.C. is not an alternative or an additional jurisdiction but it is a jurisdiction preserved in the interest of justice to redress grievances for which no other procedure is available or has been provided by the Code itself. Thus, while it is apparent that the inherent power under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. is invoked and exercised cautiously by the High Courts, it is equally apparent that it is not settled law that the power/jurisdiction available under sections 249-A and 265-K are necessarily alternative remedies thereto.
Limitation on quashing investigation
A common misperception and resultant misapplication of precedents in opposing quashing of proceedings is lack of proper appreciation of the fact and circumstances of the particular case law involved. The majority of judgments setting aside or dismissing a prayer for quashing have been passed in those cases where the case is still at the stage of investigation. By way of illustration, in Ghulam Mustafa v. State14, a Bench of the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's acceptance of a petition for quashing, however, the particular facts of the case reflect all charges were non-compoundable as well as exceptional circumstances were involved. In Ghulam Muhammad v. Muzammal Khan15, the Hon'ble Supreme Court set aside quashing on the ground additional charges had been added during investigation that the High Court had not considered. It is arguable that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ajmeel Khan v. Abdul Rahim16, relied on a precedent that itself had set aside quashing on the ground that it was at the stage of investigation whereas the lis before the Hon'ble Court in 2009 was on distinguishable, more advanced trial/prosecution stage. Similarly, in PLD 2014 SC 753(ibid), the Hon'ble Court upheld dismissal of a quashing petition as the relief was sought against an order passed by the Justice of Peace under section 22(a), Cr.P.C. and hence, the petition was not maintainable in any event.
In Director-General Anti-Corruption Establishment, Lahore v. Muhammad Akram Khan, PLD 2013 SC 401, a two-Member Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that "partial quashing of an FIR to the extent of some of the accused persons mentioned therein is a legal impossibility." Furthermore, the Hon'ble Bench of the apex Court held, that since the trial court had taken cognizance of the case in question, the FIR could not be quashed as the fate of the accused had to be determined by the trial Court itself. It was held that the proceedings could be terminated under sections 249-A/265-K, Cr.P.C., if the charge against the accused was groundless or there was no probability of his conviction. Conversely, and in stark contrast thereto, in an earlier decision, a three-Member Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in 2009 held: "In law, nothing warrants for the argument that since charge has been framed by the trial Court, the proceedings could not be buried by way of quashment. There is no invariable rule of law and it was dependent on the facts of each case whether to allow the proceedings to continue or to nip in the bud. In our opinion, a case of interference by this Court is made out".
The above referred 2013 decision, in juxtaposition to the referred 2009 decision of the Supreme Court, has posed a real challenge to the interpretation and scope of the inherent jurisdiction granted to the High Court under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. The 2013 judgment is relied upon extensively and unjustifiably over and above well-established precedents of the apex Court in dismissing petitions for quashing FIRs. Reliance on PLD 2013 SC 401 is therefore, questionable for the following reasons: a) its use deprecates the settled law that discourages the omnibus application of precedents in criminal matters; b) the judgment does not distinguish the established precedents of the apex Court that hold that powers under sections 249-A/265-K, Cr.P.C. are not alternative remedies to section 561-A, Cr.P.C. or that framing of charge is no bar to the High Court exercising its powers under section 561-A, Cr.P.C., and c) its use is not justified to overrule contradictory findings of larger sized Benches.
The reliance on PLD 2013 SC 401 by the High Courts to dismiss writs for quashing FIRs has been encouraged and enhanced by the silence of the Hon'ble Supreme Court since 2013 with regard to the judgment's omnibus application to petitions for quashing FIRs and arguably, has had a stunting effect on jurisprudential development in this regard.
The role of precedent in criminal cases
The role of stare decisis in adjudication is crucial in terms of establishing the rule of law and consistency in judgments. However, the applicability of a legal principle and its adaptation to attendant facts and circumstances cannot be overemphasized either - it is an equally established principle that the role of precedent in criminal matters must be construed narrowly and subject to attendant facts and circumstances.Furthermore, the superior Courts in Pakistan have repeatedly held that the principle of stare decisis is not "inflexible" and does not come into play if it violates the spirit of the relevant statutory provision. The question that arises then is whether the 2013 decision of the Supreme Court laid down a binding principle that must be followed in all future cases pertaining to the scope of section 561-A, Cr.P.C. The role of precedent has been elaborately discussed by the apex Court in Messrs Khurshid Soap and Chemical Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. through Sheikh Muhammad Ilyas and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources and others20, in paragraph 84, as follows:
"84. Е It is settled law that if a new case is dissimilar to an earlier case in ways that seem important, the court will "distinguish" it and reach a result different from what the precedent would otherwise suggest or even dictate. In common parlance, either the precedent or the pending case may be said to be "distinguished" from the other. In this way, the former decision might be said to be "rerationalized." A precedent, whether persuasive or binding, need not be applied or followed if it can be distinguished; that is, there is a material distinction between the facts of the precedent case and the case in question. According to Zander, "distinguishing between factual situations and applying the appropriate rule of law is one of the lawyer's and judge's most crucial functions." The technique of distinguishing past case is a powerful engine of legal change. Distinguishing means that each case was decided correctly based solely on its own facts because the facts were materially different. Joseph Raz argues that the boundaries of distinguishing "are far from fixed," he asserts that, the [boundaries] undergo continual change". The crucial question is: Are there any material differences between the facts of the case at bar and the facts of the prior cases to warrant the rule being different? In principle, the distinguishing of an apparent decision presents no problem for the doctrine of precedent"
It is manifest that, subsequent to 2013, Courts have been hesitant to allow quashing of FIR under section 561-A, Cr.P.C., despite the number of earlier affirmations of the use of section 561-A prior to 2013 by the Supreme Court. The question that requires resolution is whether PLD 2013 SC 401 is the final word on the matter of quashing or whether there is still scope to interpret section 561-A, Cr.P.C. on the basis of earlier interpretations. In this respect, a definitive pronouncement of the apex Court discussing the scope of section 561-A, Cr.P.C. in light of the 2013 judgement of the Honourable Court, would be valuable in illuminating the scope of the inherent powers granted to the High Courts in this respect.
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