F.I.R. which is always considered as “cornerstone” has lost its value in case and superstructure i.e. case of prosecution built on basis of this F.I.R. is bound to fall like house of cards

F.I.R. which is always considered as “cornerstone” has lost its value in case and superstructure i.e. case of prosecution built on basis of this F.I.R. is bound to fall like house of cards


 PLJ 2024 Cr.C. (Note) 83

[Lahore High Court, Lahore]

Present: Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan and Farooq Haider, JJ.

PERVAIZ AHMAD--Appellant

versus

STATE--Respondent

Crl. A. No. 45528-J & M.R. No. 210 of 2019, heard on 31.10.2023.

Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 (XLV of 1860)--

----Ss. 302(b)--Qatl-e-amd--Conviction and sentence--Challenge to--Delay in recording statement--Testimony of witness--Any explanation to justify this delay in recording of his statement and/ introducing him as eye-witness has not been offered by prosecution and by now it is well settled that if statement of witness is recorded with delay--Advantageously referred--In such circumstances, testimony of such witness who has not been mentioned as eye-witness in F.I.R. cannot be termed as confidence inspiring and in this regard--It is well settled that witness who introduces dishonest improvement or omission for strengthening case, cannot be relied--Even otherwise, it is not understandable that when accused was having sufficient time to wash/clean knife (چھری) then why he kept same in blood stained form and for said reason also, said recovery is not reliable rather doubtful and in this regard--In this case, eye-witness and (given-up PW) were recovery witnesses; so, (PW-8) cannot corroborate his own testimony and on this score also, this piece of evidence is of no evidentiary value--Held: It is well established principle of law that single dent/circumstance in case of prosecution is sufficient for acquittal; can be safely referred-- Nutshell of above discussion is that prosecution has been failed to prove its case against appellant; therefore, there is no need to discuss defence version.                          [Para 7, 8 & 8-A] D, E, F, H, I & J

2022 SCMR 986, 2006 SCMR 1152, 2021 SCMR 1428, 2019 SCMR 631, 2021 SCMR 810, PLJ 1996 SC 139 and 2022 SCMR 1527.

First Information Report--

----It is well settled that First Information Report lays foundation of criminal case and when it has not been promptly recorded rather with delay as stated above and no reasonable explanation regarding its delayed recording has come on record, then it is fatal for case of prosecution.             [Para 7] A

2019 SCMR 1068, 2019 SCMR 1170, 2019 SCMR 1391, 2019 SCMR 1978, 2021 SCMR 16 & 2021 SCMR 542.

F.I.R.--

----F.I.R. which is always considered as “cornerstone” has lost its value in case and superstructure i.e. case of prosecution built on basis of this F.I.R. is bound to fall like house of cards. [Para 7] B

2021 SCMR 23, 2022 SCMR 393 & 2022 SCMR 1527.

Chance witness--

----He was also a “chance witness” and bound to prove valid reason to justify his coming and presence at relevant “time and place” of occurrence; though he stated that he received information that appellant was quarrelling with his niece and he along with (complainant/ PW-6) and (given-up PW) went to house of appellant yet in his statement before Court he also could not explain that how and from whom he received said information, therefore, he also could not prove “cause” of his arrival as well as of other eye-witnesses at relevant “time and place” of occurrence; therefore, he is also a “chance witness”, who could not establish any reason regarding his arrival and presence at “time and place” of occurrence--So, evidence of both aforementioned cited eye-witnesses, who could not establish any valid reason/cause regarding their presence at “time and place” of occurrence, is “suspect” evidence and cannot be accepted without pinch of salt.                                                        [Para 7] C

2015 SCMR 1142.

Medical Evidence--

----So far as medical evidence is concerned, it is trite law that medical evidence is mere supportive/confirmatory type of evidence; it can tell about locale, nature, magnitude of injury and kind of weapon used for causing injury but it cannot tell about identity of assailant who caused injury; therefore, same is also of no help to prosecution in peculiar facts and circumstances of case.                                               [Para 7] G

2019 SCMR 872.

Mr. Kamran Javed Malik, Advocate for Appellant.

Mr. Munir Ahmad Sayal, Deputy Prosecutor General for State.

Khawaja Shoaib Mushtaq, Advocate for Irshad Begum (mother of Sanam Shehzadi (deceased of the case) for Complainant.

Date of hearing: 31.10.2023.

Judgment

Farooq Haider, J.--This single judgment will dispose of Crl. Appeal No. 45528-J/2019 filed by Pervaiz Ahmad (appellant) against his “conviction & sentence” and Murder Reference No. 210/2019 sent by trial Court, as both the matters have arisen out of one and the same judgment dated 20.05.2019 passed by Addl. Sessions Judge, Sialkot/trial Court.

2. Pervaiz Ahmad (appellant) was tried in case arising out of F.I.R. No. 246/2018 dated 28.04.2018 registered under Sections 302, 109, PPC at Police Station: Nekapura, District Sialkot; trial Court after conclusion of the trial vide impugned judgment dated 20.05.2019 has convicted and sentenced the appellant as under:

Conviction

Sentence

Under Section 302(b), PPC

“Death” as Taz’ir on two counts along with payment of compensation of Rs. 300,000/- to the legal heirs of Mst. SanamShehzadi (deceased) under Section 544 [sic], Cr.P.C. and in default of payment of compensation amount to further undergo S.I. for six months.

3. Brief facts, as per application (Ex.PC) moved by Rizwan Ahmad (complainant/PW-6) to Arshad Ali A.S.I. (PW-4) at Police Station: Nekapura, District: Sialkot on 28.04.2018 for registration of case are that complainant is resident of Tauheed Town, Nawan Pind Araian, Sialkot and lives abroad in Saudi Arabia; marriage of sister of the complainant namely Sanam Shehzadi aged about 30/32 years was executed with Pervaiz Ahmad about ten years ago and they have been blessed two children i.e. elder son namely Subhan aged about 7/8 years and daughter namely Rida aged about ¾ years; Pervaiz Ahmad oftenly used to quarrel with sister of the complainant; he wanted to sell house, however, sister of the complainant used to refrain him; on 28.04.2018 at about 01:00 (night) complainant received information that Pervaiz Ahmad was uttering abuses and quarrelling with his sister, upon which, complainant along with Muhammad Ashraf and Naseer Hussain went to the house of Pervaiz Ahmad, who was quarrelling with sister of the complainant; he was made understand (جس کو سمجھایا) due to which he became silent for the time being; subsequently complainant and PWs slept there in the Baithak (بیٹیک) and about 03:00 a.m. (night) woke up after hearing noise/report of cry; electric bulbs of the room and Courtyard were litting and they saw that Pervaiz Ahmad armed with knife (چهری)was giving repeated blows to Sanam (sister of the complainant) who was sitting on a cot; they tried to catch/apprehend the accused but he fled away; they saw that sister of the complainant who becoming severely injured had expired; Pervaiz Ahmad on the instigation and in consultation with his brother namely Muhammad Arif, who used to ask him for selling the house, committed murder of sister of the complainant; complainant submitted application for legal proceedings.

On the basis of application (Ex.PC), F.I.R. (Ex.PC/1) was chalked out by Arshad Ali A.S.I. (PW-4).

After completion of investigation, challan report under Section: 173, Cr.P.C. was submitted against the appellant in the Court wherein name of Muhammad Arif (co-accused/brother of present appellant) was placed in Column No. 2 as he was found innocent in the case, appellant was formally charge sheeted but he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial whereupon prosecution evidence was summoned; after recording of prosecution evidence, appellant was examined under Section: 342, Cr.P.C. but he refuted the allegations levelled against him; he neither opted to appear as his own witness under Section: 340(2), Cr.P.C. nor produced any evidence in his defence.

Trial Court after conclusion of trial has convicted and sentenced the appellant as mentioned above through the impugned judgment dated: 20.05.2019.

4. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that conviction recorded and sentence awarded to the appellant through impugned judgment are against the ‘law and facts’ of the case; ocular account is neither trustworthy nor corroborated/supported by any other independent evidence; prosecution has remained unable to prove its case. Learned counsel for the appellant finally prayed for acquittal of the appellant.

5. Learned Deputy Prosecutor General and learned counsel for the legal heir i.e. mother of the deceased have supported the impugned judgment and prayed for dismissal of the appeal.

6. Arguments heard. Record perused.

7. It has been noticed that as per case of prosecution, occurrence allegedly took place in the mid night at about 03:00 a.m. on 28.04.2018 in the area of Tauheed Town, which is situated at a distance of 3-km from the police station as per Column No. 4 of the F.I.R. (Ex.PC/1), however, case was got registered by Rizwan Ahmad {complainant/PW-6/brother of Mst. Sanam Shehzadi (deceased of the case)} through written application (Ex.PC), which according to case of prosecution, was produced to Arshad Ali A.S.I. (PW-4) at Police Station: Nekapura, District: Sialkot at 8/9 a.m. on 28.04.2018; as mentioned above, place of occurrence was just at a distance of 3-k.m. from the police station but case was got registered after delay of about 5-hours and any explanation in this regard is neither mentioned in the application (Ex.PC) for registration of case nor otherwise brought on the record by the prosecution; furthermore, Rizwan Ahmad (complainant/PW-6) clearly stated during his statement before the Court that police reached at the place of occurrence after one hour of the occurrence and application was written by police officer reached at the place of occurrence; relevant portion of his statement in this regard is hereby reproduced as under:

“Police reached at the place of occurrence after one hour of the occurrence. Application was written by police officer reached at the place of occurrence drafted by me.”

In this regard, Urdu version of statement of complainant/PW-6 is also hereby reproduced below:

"پولیس وقوعہ کے ایک گھنٹہ بعد وہاں پہنچی تھی۔ درخواست پولیس والے آفیسر نے میرے بتانے پر تحریر کی تھی۔"

This statement of the complainant/PW-6 on the one hand contradicts aforementioned stance of the prosecution that complainant moved application (Ex.PC) for registration of case in the police station whereas on the other hand reflects that police reached at the place of occurrence one hour after the occurrence and occurrence took place at 03:00 a.m., meaning thereby that police reached at the place of occurrence at 04:00 a.m., then why case was not registered immediately thereafter rather at 08:09 a.m. on 28.04.2018; furthermore, question does arise that where is the application which was recorded by police officer at the spot and why case was not registered on the basis of said application? It is also relevant to mention here that distance between place of occurrence and hospital was just 7-k.m. and in this regard, relevant portion of statement of complainant/PW-6 is hereby reproduced:-

“Distance between place of occurrence and hospital is about 07 kilometers.”

However, perusal of post-mortem examination report (Ex.PA) reflects that complete documents were received from the police on 28.04.2018 at 04:00 p.m. and post-mortem examination over dead body was conducted on 28.04.2018 at 04:15 p.m. Dr. Sidra Aslam (PW-1), who conducted post-mortem examination over dead body of deceased of the case, in her statement before the Court clearly stated that she conducted post-mortem examination at 04:15 p.m. on 28.04.2018; in this regard, relevant portion her statement is reproduced below:

“The time of death was on 28.04.2018 at 3:00 am and examination of dead body was done at 04:15 p.m. on 28.04.2018.”

Doctor/PW-1 further deposed that as soon as she received complete papers, she commenced the proceeding of autopsy; in this regard, relevant portion of her statement is reproduced as under:

“I was on duty for 24 hours on 28.04.2018. as soon as I received the complete papers I commenced the proceeding of autopsy.”

Therefore, autopsy over dead body of the deceased lady was conducted after about lapse of more than 13-hours of the occurrence, which state of affairs clearly suggests that none of the cited eye-witnesses including the complainant was present at the relevant “time and place” of occurrence, time was consumed for engaging/procuring witnesses, tailoring story for prosecution, then getting the case registered in its present form and completing police papers for post-mortem examination. It further reflects that First Information Report (F.I.R.) was not recorded at the stated time rather with much delay however ante-time was shown in the record in this regard; therefore, neither any sanctity nor evidentiary value can be attached to the First Information Report (F.I.R.) in the case and it cannot provide any corroboration to the case of prosecution against the appellant rather it has lost its efficacy and smashed the case of prosecution; in this regard, guidance has been sought from the case of “Haroon Shafique versus The State and others” (2018 SCMR 2118). By now it is well settled that First Information Report lays foundation of the criminal case and when it has not been promptly recorded rather with delay as stated above and no reasonable explanation regarding its delayed recording has come on the record, then it is fatal for the case of prosecution; in this regard, guidance has been sought from the case of “Muhammad Rafique alias Feeqa versus The State” (2019 SCMR 1068), “Tariq Mehmood versus The State and others” (2019 SCMR 1170), “Tariq Ali Shah and another versus The State and others” (2019 SCMR 1391), “Safdar Mehmood and others versus Tanvir Hussain and others” (2019 SCMR 1978), “Muhammad Adnan and another versus The State and others” (2021 SCMR 16) and “Ghulam Mustafa versus The State” (2021 SCMR 542). Furthermore, F.I.R. which is always considered as “cornerstone” has lost its value in the case and superstructure i.e. case of prosecution built on the basis of this F.I.R. is bound to fall like house of cards; in this regard, guidance has been sought from the case of “Ghulam Abbas and another versus The State and another” (2021 SCMR 23), “Pervaiz Khan and another versus The State” (2022 SCMR 393), “Abdul Ghafoor versus The State” (2022 SCMR 1527).

Ocular account in the case produced by prosecution comprises of statements of Rizwan Ahmad (complainant/PW-6), Subhan (PW-7) and Muhammad Ashraf (PW-8). Rizwan Ahmad (complainant/PW-6) is brother of Mst. SanamShehzadi (deceased of the case), Subhan (PW-7) is maternal nephew (بھانجا) of the complainant and son of the deceased lady whereas Muhammad Ashraf (PW-8) is maternal uncle (ماموں) of the complainant. Admittedly, Rizwan Ahmad (complainant/PW-6) is not resident of the house of occurrence, therefore, he is a “chance witness” and was bound to prove valid reason to justify his coming and presence at the relevant “time and place” of occurrence; though as per claim of prosecution, on 28.04.2018 at about 01:00 a.m. (night), information was received by the complainant/PW-6 that Pervaiz Ahmad (appellant) was uttering abuses and quarrelling with his sister, he along with witnesses i.e. Muhammad Ashraf (PW-8) and Naseer Hussain (given-up PW) went to the house of Pervaiz Ahmad (appellant) yet how he came to know about said quarrel, what was the source in said regard, through whom he received said information and name of any witness, who heard or saw and informed the complainant about said quarrel, is neither mentioned in the application (Ex.PC) for registration of case nor brought on record during trial, hence, this very reason which was claimed by the complainant/PW-6 as main “cause” of his arrival as well as of cited eye-witnesses at the “time and place” of occurrence, could not be proved; therefore, he is a “chance witness”, who could not establish any valid reason regarding his arrival and presence at the “time and place” of occurrence.

Similarly, Muhammad Ashraf (PW-8) is also not resident of the house of the occurrence rather he himself deposed that distance between his residence and place of occurrence is about two kilometers; in this regard; relevant portion of his statement is as under:

“The distance between my residence and place of occurrence is about two kilometers.”

So, he was also a “chance witness” and bound to prove valid reason to justify his coming and presence at the relevant “time and place” of occurrence; though he stated that he received information that Pervaiz Ahmad was quarrelling with his niece and he along with Rizwan Ahmad (complainant/ PW-6) and Naseer Hussain (given-up PW) went to the house of Pervaiz Ahmad (appellant) yet in his statement before the Court he also could not explain that how and from whom he received said information, therefore, he also could not prove the “cause” of his arrival as well as of other eye-witnesses at the relevant “time and place” of occurrence; therefore, he is also a “chance witness”, who could not establish any reason regarding his arrival and presence at the “time and place” of occurrence. So, evidence of both aforementioned cited eye-witnesses, who could not establish any valid reason/cause regarding their presence at the “time and place” of occurrence, is “suspect” evidence and cannot be accepted without pinch of salt; guidance in this regard has been sought from the case of “Mst. Sughra Begum and another vs. Qaiser Pervez and others” (2015 SCMR 1142) and relevant portion from paragraph No. 14 of said case law is hereby reproduced:

“14. A chance witness, in legal parlance is the one who claims that he was present on the crime spot at the fateful time, albeit, his Presence there was a sheer chance as in the ordinary course of business, place of residence and normal course of events, he was not supposed to be present on the spot but at a place where he Resides, carries on business or runs day to day life affairs. It is in this context that the testimony of chance witness, ordinarily, is not accepted unless justifiable reasons are shown to establish his Presence at the crime scene at the relevant time. In normal course, the presumption under the law would operate about his absence from the crime spot. True that in rare cases, the testimony of chance witness may be relied upon, provided some convincing explanations appealing to prudent mind for his presence on the crime spot are put forth, when the occurrence took place otherwise, his testimony would fall within the category of suspect evidence and cannot be accepted without a pinch of salt.

Further guidance on the subject has been sought from the cases of “G. M. Niaz versus The State” (2018 SCMR 506). “Muhammad Ashraf alias Acchu versus The State” (2019 SCMR 652), “Sufyan Nawaz and another versus The State and others” (2020 SCMR 192), “Mst. Mir Zalai versus Ghazi Khan And Others” (2020 SCMR 319), “Ibrar Hussain and another versus The State” (2020 SCMR 1850) and “Sarfraz and another versus The State” (2023 SCMR 670).

Perusal of Column No. 8 of the Inquest Report (Ex.PM) reflects that mouth and eyes of the deceased were semi open
(منہ تھوڑا کھلا انکھیں تھوڑی کھلی ہوئیں) and statement of Dr. Sidra Aslam (WMO/PW-1) also reveals that mouth was open and eyes of the deceases were semi-open; Rizwan Ahmad (complainant/PW-6) is brother of the deceased, Muhammad Ashraf (PW-8) is maternal uncle of the complainant whereas Naseer Hussain (given-up PW) is brother-in-law “بہنوئی”of the complainant, had they been present at the place of occurrence, at the relevant time, then they would have definitely closed the mouth and eyes of the deceased; while observing so, guidance has been sought from the cases of “Muhammad Asif versus The State” (2017 SCMR 486) and “Muhammad Rafique alias Feeqa versus The State” (2019 SCMR 1068).

Rizwan Ahmad (complainant/PW-6/brother of deceased), Muhammad Ashraf (PW-8/maternal uncle of the complainant) and Naseer Hussain (given- up PW/brother-in-law (“بہنوئی”) of the complainant) were three in number and assailant was only one but they did not attempt to intervene at the time of occurrence particularly when it is not case of prosecution that Pervaiz Ahmad (appellant) was equipped with any sophisticated fire-arm weapon rather he was having a knife (چھری) only and it was very easy for them to intervene/catch hold/apprehend and overpower the assailant and rescue the deceased when he was giving repeated blows of knife (چھری) but they remained there as silent spectators; furthermore, it was not impossible for them to apprehend the assailant after the occurrence because according to site-plan (Ex.PJ), there was only one door for entry and exit from the room where occurrence statedly took place and said door was occupied by the complainant and other cited eye-witnesses but they could not apprehend him. Said conduct of aforementioned cited eye-witnesses including the complainant, who are closely related to the deceased, falsifies their presence at the place of occurrence; in this regard, guidance has been sought from the case of “Pathan versus The State” (2015 SCMR 315) and “Zafar versus The State and others” (2018 SCMR 326); relevant portion from the latter case law is being Reproduced:

“7. The conduct of the witnesses of ocular account also deserves some attention. According to complainant, he along with UmerDaraz and Riaz (given up PW) witnessed the whole occurrence when their father was being murdered. It is against the normal human conduct that the complainant, UmerDaraz and Riaz (PW since given up) did not make even an abortive attempt to catch hold of the appellant and his co- accused particularly when the complainant himself has stated in the FIR and before the learned trial Court that when they raised alarm, the accused fled away. Had they been present at the relevant time, they would not have waited for the murder of their deceased father and would have raised alarm the moment they saw the appellant and his co-accused standing near the cot of their father”

So far as Subhan (PW-7) is concerned, though as per claim of the prosecution, he was minor child of deceased of the case and produced as eye-witness of the occurrence yet he was merely mentioned as child of deceased lady in the application (Ex.PC) for registration of case but not mentioned as “eye-witness” in said application as well as in F.I.R. (Ex.PC/1) however was introduced as eye-witness through dishonest improvement by the complainant (PW-6) and relevant portion of statement of complainant/PW-6 is hereby reproduced:-

“The witnesses of occurrence are myself, Naseer, Ashraf and Subhan.”

However, he was duly confronted and it was proved as dishonest improvement; in this regard, relevant portion of his statement is reproduced as under:

“It is correct that there was no mention of PW Subhan in the said application Ex. PC.”

Muhammad Ashraf (cited eye-witness/PW-8) in his statement before the Court did not state that occurrence was also witnessed by Subhan (PW-7) rather he clearly stated that occurrence was witnessed by him, Rizwan Ahmad (complainant/PW-6) and Naseer (given-up PW); in this regard, relevant portion of his statement is reproduced as under:

“The occurrence was witnessed by myself, Rizwan and Nasser.”

Perusal of site-plan (Ex.PJ available at Page No. 121-122 of the Paper Book) of the place of occurrence prepared by draftsman on the pointing out of cited eye-witnesses including complainant, reveals that Subhan (PW-7) has neither been mentioned as eye-witness of the occurrence nor as present in the house of occurrence in the same. Till 03.05.2018, he was not shown as eye-witness of the occurrence rather his statement was first time recorded by the police after 5-days of the occurrence i.e. on 03.05.2018 and in this regard, relevant portion of statement of Subhan (PW-7) is reproduced below:

“The police recorded my statement on 03.05.2018. I did not mention the date of occurrence in my statement recorded before police.”

Any explanation to justify this delay in recording of his statement and introducing him as eye-witness has not been offered by the prosecution and by now it is well settled that if statement of the witness is recorded with delay, then it diminishes its evidentiary value; in this regard, case of “Bashir Muhammad Khan versus The State” (2022 SCMR 986) can be advantageously referred. In such circumstances, testimony of such witness who has not been mentioned as eye-witness in the F.I.R. cannot be termed as confidence inspiring and in this regard, cases of “Rashid Ahmed versus Muhammad Nawaz and others” (2006 SCMR 1152) and “Abdul Latif versus Noor Zaman and another” (2021 SCMR 1428) can be safely referred.

It is important to mention here that Subhan (PW-7) in his statement before the Court, did not mention presence of complainant and other cited eye-witnesses i.e. Muhammad Ashraf (PW-8) and Naseer (given-up PW) at the “time and place” of occurrence. Complainant also introduced aforementioned dishonest improvement qua introducing Subhan (PW-7) as eye-witness and by now it is well settled that witness who introduces dishonest improvement or omission for strengthening the case, cannot be relied; in this regard, case of “Muhammad Arif versus The State” (2019 SCMR 631) and “Khalid Mehmood and another versus The State and others” (2021 SCMR 810) can be advantageously referred.

It is relevant to mention here that complainant in his application (Ex.PC) for registration of case claimed that Mst. Sanam Shehzadi (deceased lady of the case) was his sister, who married with Pervaiz Ahmad (appellant) but during cross-examination admitted that his sister obtained divorce from present appellant after filing suit for dissolution of marriage and then contracted marriage with Foreman working in the factory who was resident of KharotaSyedan and said marriage lasted for about 2-3 months; relevant portion of his statement is hereby reproduced:

“My sister got divorce from accused Tariq Parvez by filing a suit for dissolution of marriage on 15.12.2011. It is correct that after becoming effective of that divorce proceeding, certificate of effectiveness was duly issued by Union council No. 21 namely Cherind on 02.05.2012. After that divorce my deceased sister got married with a foreman working in that factory. Subhan child PW was living with her mother. The said foreman was resident of KharotaSyedan. The marriage between my deceased sister and foreman lasted for two three months.”

Similarly, Muhammad Ashraf (PW-8) admitted during his statement before the Court that deceased of the case obtained divorce from present appellant and contracted marriage with Mohsin Shah, Foreman; in this regard, relevant portion of his statement is reproduced below:

“It is correct that my maternal niece since dead got married with that Mohsin Shah foreman and she got divorce from present accused Parvez.”

It has been admitted by the complainant/PW-6 that deceased of the case obtained divorce from present appellant and contracted marriage with Mohsin Shah, Foreman and said marriage lasted for about 2-3 months but neither it has come on the record nor proved by the prosecution that when she again contracted marriage with present appellant; any Nikahkhawan or witness of said re-marriage has not been produced during trial and even it has not been mentioned in the statements of the complainant as well as cited eye-witnesses before the Court that deceased lady again contracted marriage with the appellant; so, claim of the complainant/ PW-6 and Muhammad Ashraf (PW-8) that appellant had been quarrelling with the deceased lady and on said night they received information that he was quarrelling with said lady and due to said reason, they went over there, is a question mark and raises eyebrows because when she had already obtained divorce from the appellant and any material has not come on the record to the effect that she again contracted marriage with him, then how and why she was residing with the appellant in his house, hence, aforementioned claim of the complainant as well as prosecution in this regard, is neither plausible nor could be proved and even otherwise against the normal human conduct. Therefore, it appears to be a cock and bull story without any evidence.

It is also relevant to mention here that as per Column No. 4 of the F.L.R. (Ex.PC/1), occurrence took place in the area of Tauheed Town but during cross-examination, complainant/PW-6 clearly stated that distance between Tauheed Town and place of occurrence is 400/500 yards; in this regard, relevant portion of his statement is reproduced as under: -

“The distance between Toheed Town and place of occurrence is 400/500 yards.”

So, when on the one hand as per F.I.R. (Ex.PC/1), occurrence took place in the area of Tauheed Town whereas complainant stated that distance between Tauheed Town and place of occurrence is 400/500 yards, then exactness of place of occurrence is also doubtful in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case.

It Is also relevant to mention here that blood was secured from place of occurrence through cotton and said blood stained cotton was sent to Punjab Forensic Science Agency, Lahore and though as per report of PFSA, Lahore (ExPQ), human blood was identified on the same yet DNA profile obtained from the same was found as partial and inconclusive; in this regard, relevant portions of aforementioned report of PFSA (Ex.PQ) are reproduced below: -

“1. Cotton.”

“The DNA profile obtained from item #1 is partial and inconclusive.”

So, it could not conclusively opined by the Punjab Forensic Science Agency, Lahore that blood collected through cotton from the place of occurrence was of deceased lady of the case and this fact also raises eyebrows regarding certainty of the place of occurrence.

When all aforementioned factors are taken into consideration in totality, then ocular account furnished by complainant/PW-6, Subhan (PW-7) and Muhammad Ashraf (PW-8) is neither confidence inspiring nor truthful; hence, same cannot be relied and is hereby discarded.

So far as medical evidence is concerned, it is trite law that medical evidence is mere supportive/confirmatory type of evidence; it can tell about locale, nature, magnitude of injury and kind of weapon used for causing injury but it cannot tell about identity of the assailant who caused the injury; therefore, same is also of no help to the prosecution in peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, in this regard, case of Sajjan Solangi versus The State (2019 SCMR 872) can be safely referred.

As far as motive is concerned, it was claimed by the complainant/PW-6 in application (Ex.PC) for registration of case that Pervaiz Ahmad (appellant) used to quarrel with deceased of the case/sister of the complainant as he wanted to sell the house whereas Mst. SanamShehzadi was nefraining him to do so, during his statement before the Court, complainant/PW-6 also deposed in this regard; relevant portion of his statement is hereby reproduced:-

“Tariq Parvez used to quarrel with my sister SanamShahzadi, the cause of dispute was that he insisted my sister to sell out the property measuring three marlas built house situated at Toheed Town, Sialkot.”

It was not claim of the complainant that said house was in the name or ownership of deceased lady and appellant was compelling her to sell the same and any document to support this fact that said house was in the name of deceased lady has not been produced by the prosecution rather Muhammad Ashraf (PW-8) during his statement before the Court stated that said house was in the name of the appellant; in this regard, relevant portion of his statement is as under:-

“The said house was in the name of accused Parvez present in the Court.”

Furthermore, it has not brought on the record by the prosecution that to whom appellant was selling said house; even name of any witness in whose presence, quarrel over said issue took place, was neither mentioned in the application (Ex.PC) for registration of case nor any such witness was produced before the Court to prove the same. Even otherwise, if said house was not in the name of the deceased lady rather in the name of present appellant, then he was in a quite good position to sell the same without getting any prior permission from the deceased lady and mere refraining of said lady was of no avail particularly when it has come on record that she had already obtained divorce from the appellant and then contracted marriage with another person namely Mohsin Shah, Foreman and thereafter any proof to the effect that she had again contracted marriage with the present appellant, is not available on the record, thus, said claim of the prosecution as motive of the occurrence is neither appealing to the common prudent man nor plausible; therefore, said motive has not been proved.

So far as recovery of knife (چھری)/P-8 on the pointing out of the appellant is concerned, suffice it to say that though it is claim of the prosecution that appellant got recovered knife (چهری) on 04.05.2018 in the presence of Muhammad Ashraf (PW-8) and Naseer Hussain (given-up PW) and same was found as blood stained as per report of Punjab Forensic Science Agency, Lahore (Ex.PQ) yet as per own case of the prosecution, it was got recovered from an under construction house of one MehrQaisar which was a common place and easily accessible; in this regard, relevant portion of statement of Muhammad Ashraf (PW-8) is hereby reproduced below:

“The place from where the weapon of offence was recovered is a common place, where everybody can come easily.”

So, on this score alone also, recovery is inconsequential; in this regard, case of “Muhammad Saleem versus Shabbir Ahmed and others” (2016 SCM R 1605) can be advantageously referred and relevant portion from the same is hereby reproduced below:

“We have noticed that the weapon in issue had allegedly been recovered from a place which was open and accessible to all and sundry and, thus, it was unsafe to place reliance upon such recovery.”

In this regard, guidance can also be sought from the case of “Amir Muhammad Khan versus The State” (2023 SCMR 566); relevant Portion from said case law is also reproduced below:

“So far as recovery of blood-stained hatchet is concerned, the same was allegedly recovered on the pointation of appellant from a thoroughfare, which was easily accessible to everyone, therefore, it is Settled law that the same is inconsequential.”

Admittedly, owner of said under construction house from where knife (چھری) P-8 was allegedly recovered, was not interrogated during investigation of the case; in this regard, relevant portion of statement of Irfan Ashraf S.I./Investigating Officer (PW-10) is reproduced as under:

“I did not interrogate the owner of house from where the crime weapon Churri was recovered.”

Investigating Officer (PW-10) also stated that it was commonly available in the market and house of recovery was un-attended under construction house; relevant portion of his statement is reproduced below:

“It is correct that kind of recovered weapon, is commonly available in the market. There was no any other person available at the place of Recovery as it was under construction house.

(emphasis added)

He further deposed that said weapon was recovered from a box which was locked but he did not take into possession said lock or any key of said lock; in this regard, relevant portion of his statement is reproduced as under:

“The box from where the crime weapon was recovered, was locked from outside. The accused who concealed the key of lock of said box, produced it before me and unlocked said lock. I did not take into possession the said lock, key and the box from where weapon of offence was recovered.

(emphasis added)

Even otherwise, it is not understandable that when accused was having sufficient time to wash/clean the knife (چھری), then why he kept the same in blood stained form and for said reason also, said recovery is not reliable rather doubtful and in this regard, case of “Basharat and another versus State” (PLJ 1996 SC 139) can be safely referred; relevant portion from the same is hereby reproduced:

“11. The occurrence took place on 20.4.1988. Basharat appellant was arrested on 28-4-1988. The blood-stained churri was allegedly recovered from his house on 30-4-1988. It is not believable that he would have kept blood-stained churri intact in his house for ten days when he had sufficient time and opportunity to wash away and clean the blood on it.”

Furthermore, perusal of report of Punjab Forensic Science Agency, Lahore )Ex.PQ) reveals that though swabs taken from the blade of the knife (چھری) was found as blood stained yet swabs taken from handle of the same (which was marked as “Item No. 2.2”) was not got analyzed; in this regard, relevant portions of aforementioned report of PFSA (Ex.PQ) are reproduced below:

“2.2 Swab(s) taken from the handle of the “churri”.”

“No analysis was conducted on item #2.2 at this time.”

So, report of Punjab Forensic Science Agency, Lahore (Ex.PQ) has not conclusively proved that said knife (چهری) was used by the appellant.

Though recovery is a corroborative piece of evidence and it has to corroborate the ocular account yet it is trite law that eye-witness cannot corroborate himself and corroboration must come from independent source i.e. evidence of other witness; in this regard case of “Mst. Zahida Saleem versus Muhammad Naseem and others” (PLD 2006 Supreme Court 427), “Mst. Sughra Begum and another vs. Qaiser Pervez and others.” (2015 SCMR 1142) and “Mst. Rukhsana Begum and others vs Sajjad and others” (2017 SCMR 596), can be referred; relevant portion from “Mst. Zahida Saleem’s case (supra) is reproduced as under:

“In the present case the prosecution had produced P.W.6 and P.W.7 to prove the motive, ocular account and recovery. In the instant case the eye-witnesses and the recovery witnesses being the same, as mentioned above, the question of corroboration would be a mere farce. Whenever any corroboration is required, it empties that it should be an independent one. If the corroboration is also through the same witness whose statement is required to be corroborated it will be no corroboration in the eye of law in these circumstances, we are of the opinion that both the Court below were justified to ignore the recoveries.

In this case, Muhammad Ashraf (eye-witness/PW-8) and Naseer Hussain (given-up PW) were recovery witnesses; so, Muhammad Ashraf (PW-8) cannot corroborate his own testimony and on this score also, this piece of evidence is of no evidentiary value.

Hence, for all aforementioned reasons, recovery is also of no help to the case of prosecution.

8. It is well established principle of law that single dent/ circumstance in case of prosecution is sufficient for acquittal; in this regard, case of “Abdul Ghafoor versus The State” (2022 SCMR 1527) can be safely referred.

8-A. Nutshell of the above discussion is that prosecution has been failed to prove its case against the appellant; therefore, there is no need to discuss defence version.

9. In view of, what has been discussed above, Criminal Appeal No. 45528-J/2019, filed by Pervaiz Ahmad (appellant), is allowed; conviction recorded and sentence awarded to the appellant through impugned judgment dated 20.05.2019 is hereby set aside. Appellant is acquitted of the charge, he shall be released from the jail forthwith, if not required in any other case.

10. Resultantly, death sentence awarded to Pervaiz Ahmad (appellant) is NOT CONFIRMED and Murder Reference (M. R. No. 210 of 2019) is answered in NEGATIVE.

(A.A.K.)          Appeal allowed

 

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